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7 Sept 72

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Chemical Catalysis, ^{Joint} 1 Wkg Group
Results

OST

DATE: 12:00 18 Sept

moderate
yes

1. (U) As requested in the above Opinion Request, the following comments are forwarded:

a. (C) Positive intelligence/technological opinion: No objection.

b. (S) Security opinion:

(1) The Naval Intelligence Command (Naval Investigative Service) has completed an assessment of the potential security vulnerability of naval and defense related facilities at San Diego, California, and other ports. Although this assessment is based on the assumption that the collection operations would be conducted from Soviet ships entering the port, it has been demonstrated that trained operators entering the area in other ways would have equal facility in obtaining sensitive military information. A variety of information, which would either prove unique to existing Soviet intelligence holdings, or confirm or refine previously acquired intelligence, is readily attainable in the area. This vulnerability to foreign intelligence collection is due, in large part, to the relative size and geographic configuration of the port area, and little can be done in the way of additional security measures to prohibit the

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collection of sensitive information. If Soviets or nationals of Communist Countries are permitted to visit the San Diego area it would be extremely difficult to effectively deny access to information they need and cannot now acquire. This is particularly true in the case of research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) activities. Vigorous collection against U.S. technology can lead to the development of counter-systems shortly after new U.S. weapons achieve initial operational capability. The protection of U.S. RDT&E activities must remain a prime security objective even to the detriment of the East-West Exchange Program if necessary. For this reason it is strongly recommended that the San Diego area be excluded from any visits by the Chemical Catalysis Joint Working Group.

(2) No objection to visits to Universities participating provided no Soviet/East European visitors have any access, visual, documentary or verbal to production, research or other activities funded by Navy contracts or grants, whether classified or unclassified.

(3) The Navy Member objects to visitors under an educational exchange or visitor program visiting industrial facilities.

c. (C) It is requested that the Navy Member be given the opportunity to comment on each visit as they are determined.

J M Urban

J. M. URBAN

Navy Member

Interagency Intelligence Advisory
Group on Exchanges

18 SEP 1972

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